bepress university libraries

DigitalCommons@bepress
NIU Test
7-15-2004

The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justifications for Racial
Preferences in Public Contracting
Michael K. Fridkin

Follow this and additional works at: https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test

Recommended Citation
Fridkin, Michael K., "The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justifications for Racial Preferences in Public
Contracting" (2004). NIU Test. 1601.
https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test/1601

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@bepress. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NIU Test by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@bepress.

Non-Remedial
The Permissibility" of-FNnR
ei
Justifications for Racial Preferences in Public
Contracting
MICHAEL K. FRIDKIN*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

IN TRO D UCTION .......................................................
509
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF NON-REMEDIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
RACE CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS ..............................
511
A.
THE ACCEPTANCE OF COMPELLING, NON-REMEDIAL GOALS... 511

1.

H1.

III.

Diversity as a Compelling Interest.........................
511

2.
OperationalNeeds as a Compelling Interest...................
515
B.
THE NARROWLY TAILORED USE OF RACE FOR NON-REMEDIAL
E ND S ...........................................................
5 19
NON-REMEDIAL GOALS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTING .........................
522
C ONCLUSIO N ........................................................
525
INTRODUCTION

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
when the government discriminates on the basis of race, its conduct is
subject to exacting judicial review commonly known as "strict scrutiny."'
Strict scrutiny requires that the challenged government program satisfy
both a substantive and procedural test. First, the substantive justification
the government advances for its racial categorization must be
"compelling." Second, the process the government has selected for
achieving its compelling justification-the specific racial classification at
issue-must be "narrowly tailored" to further that compelling interest.2

Director of the Employment Opportunity Project, Chicago Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., J.D. Harvard Law School 1985.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995). The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Accordingly, all
"governmental action based on race-a group classification long recognized as 'in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited'-should be subjected to detailed judicial
inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (citation omitted).
2.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324-27 (2003); City of Richmond v. J.A.
*
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The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that public
agencies have a "compelling" interest in remedying their own past racial
discrimination. 3 This is true in the context of government contracting.
Under City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,4 if a government agency has
participated in the systemic exclusion of contractors on the basis of race,
the agency has a compelling interest in remedying that discrimination by
favoring contractors whose owners belong to the previously excluded race.5
This remedial defense of racial preferences is the standard notion of
affirmative action in public contracting.
Of great interest to the
government institutions employing racial preferences, however, is whether
any non-remedial objectives-separate and distinct from remedying
discrimination-may be relied upon to justify the use of racial
classifications in public contracting. If non-remedial goals are permitted,
then what goals in particular are compelling enough to satisfy strict
scrutiny? Finally, which of these goals apply in the context of public
contracting?
This article will explore these questions. Part I explores the general
judicial willingness to consider non-remedial justifications for race-based
programs, justifications which do not depend upon a demonstration of past
discrimination. In Part I.A., the article reviews whether the government
may ever rely upon non-remedial objectives as the basis for its conscious
use of race and, if so, which objectives are "compelling." Part I.B.
examines the current formulation of the narrow tailoring inquiry applicable
to compelling government interests. Part II applies this analysis to the area
of public contracting and discusses arguments favoring the limited use of
non-remedial justifications to racial preferences in public contracting.

Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
3.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 504.
4.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
5.
Id. at 487-506. In Croson, a construction company sued the city of Richmond,
Virginia after the company lost a public contract because it did not satisfy the city's
Minority Business Utilization Plan. That plan required the contractor to subcontract thirty
percent of the dollar amount of its contract to one or more qualifying minority business
enterprises. Invoking strict scrutiny, a plurality of the Court decided that government
contracting programs may, in narrow circumstances, use racial preferences, but only to
remedy the government's participation in industry-wide race discrimination. The plurality
also decided that Richmond had failed to prove such participation, and therefore failed to
establish its compelling interest in its racial preferences. Id.
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JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF NON-REMEDIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RACE
CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
THE ACCEPTANCE OF COMPELLING, NON-REMEDIAL GOALS

The Supreme Court decided whether the government may ever invoke
non-remedial goals as a basis for race-conscious decision making in last
year's University of Michigan Law School case. In that case, Grutter v.
Bollinger,6 the Court evaluated Michigan's explicit use of race as a factor
in admission to its law school. The University of Michigan did not seek to
justify its racial preferences as a remedy for any prior discrimination it may
have used to exclude a particular racial group. Rather, the University relied
exclusively on a single non-remedial objective: using race as a factor in
admission to the law school 7to secure "the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body.",
The Court upheld the University of Michigan's use of race in the
admissions process. In so doing, it first addressed -whether Michigan could
rely on an objective other than remedying race discrimination when
explaining its use of race. The Court's answer was straightforward. It
decided to "dispel the notion" that "remedying past discrimination is the
only permissible justification for race-based governmental action."'8 It
acknowledged that statements from prior Court opinions may have
supported the idea that rectifying past racial discrimination was the only
justification for race-conscious activity. 9 However, the Court expressly
repudiated that idea to permit judicial consideration of non-remedial
justifications for race-conscious programs. °
1.

Diversity as a Compelling Interest

On the question of what specific non-remedial objectives may be
compelling enough to survive strict scrutiny, the Court agreed that the
University of Michigan's objective-the educational benefits from student

6.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
7.
ld. at 2338.
8. Id.
9.
Id. The Court quoted to the plurality opinion in Croson, 488 U.S. at 493,
"stating that unless classifications based on race are 'strictly reserved for remedial settings,
they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility."' Id.
10.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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body diversity-was sufficiently compelling." After examining the expert
and amici presentations, the Court accepted that Michigan needed to enroll
a "critical mass" of underrepresented minorities to fulfill its educational
mission and best prepare students to succeed in the increasingly diverse
workforce.12 As the Court explained, for Michigan to achieve its
educational objectives, it is "essential" that students be exposed to a wide,
racially diverse spectrum of backgrounds.' 3 Furthermore, to create national
leaders with "legitimacy" in the eyes of the citizenry, it is "necessary" that
the path to higher education, including law schools, be "visibly" open to all
races.14 The Court emphasized the paramount importance of achieving
interracial inclusiveness: "Effective participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of
one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."' 5
The Court's language approving the non-remedial goal of educationthrough-diversity comes after five decades of mixed judicial signals on
whether non-remedial goals are ever constitutional, and if so, which types
are deemed "compelling." For example, the infamous Korematsu v. United
States' 6 case upheld the race-based internment of Japanese-Americans.
These mass relocations resulted in the most severe deprivations of liberty.
To validate the racial discrimination, the Court there relied upon the nonremedial justification of "public necessity" in a time of war.'7 However,
that decision committed "blind judicial deference to legislative or executive
pronouncements of necessity" which today "has no place in equal
protection analysis."' 8 The vehement criticism that Korematsu received at
the time of the decision and thereafter may have contributed to the
reluctance of courts to wade into the territory of non-remedial justifications
for some time.' 9

I1.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
ld. at
Id. at

2339.
2339-41.
2341.
2340-41.

323 U.S. 214 (1944).

17.
Id. at 216.
18.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235-40 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting)).
19.
Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson filed vigorous dissents in Korematsu;
Justice Murphy argued that the challenged order "falls into the ugly abyss of racism."
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233. Congress has recently agreed with the dissenters' position, and
has attempted to make amends. See Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903 ("The
Congress recognizes that . . . a grave injustice was done to both citizens and permanent
resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of
civilians during World War II.").
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In 1978, the Court confronted racial preferences in medical school
admissions in Regents of University of California.v. Bakke. 20 The decision
produced six separate opinions, none of which commanded majority
support. The opinion of Justice Powell in Bakke foreshadowed the Grutter
majority decision. He upheld student body diversity as a compelling, nonremedial interest. 21 Unlike Korematsu, Justice Powell's opinion was
careful not to defer to governmental assertions of need. For example, he
rejected as not compelling the University of California's asserted need to
erase the traditional deficit of disfavored minorities in the medical
profession. 22 Justice Powell also rejected the non-remedial goal of
"increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities
currently underserved., 23 While such a goal might be compelling in some
circumstances, the University of California had failed to prove that its
program was "geared to promote that goal. 2 4 Rather, as the Court later
would do in Grutter, he scrutinized and approved only one non-remedial
objective: need for diversity as a means to expose students to the "robust
exchange of ideas" from a variety of sources upon which our "nation's
future depends. 25
The non-remedial use of racial preferences suffered a setback eight
years after Bakke in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.26 Wygant, like
Bakke, failed to produce a majority opinion. There, the Court faced the
question of the constitutionality of racial preferences in the employment of
minority teachers at a public school. The school district asserted that the
benefit from race-conscious employment of faculty members was the
creation of "role models" for the minority students. The Court rejected as
less than compelling the role model theory.27
There is a tension between Justice Powell's recognition in Bakke that
racial preferences among student applicants creates a compelling, nonremedial benefit (education), and the Wygant plurality's rejection of the
argument that racial preferences for faculty candidates creates a similar
compelling benefit (role models).
The difference may be that the
government in Wygant did not seek to use race to achieve actual faculty

20. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
21.
Id. at 311-12.
22.
Id. at 306-07.
23.
Id. at 306, 310.
24.
Id. at 310.
25.
Id. at 313 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
26.
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
27.
Id. at 275-76 (plurality opinion); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring in judgment)
("None of the interests asserted by the [school board] ... justify this racially discriminatory
layoff policy ...").
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diversity. 8 Furthermore, it used race to create role models in an effort to
rectify "societal discrimination." But the Court concluded that abolishing
societal discrimination not itself traceable to the government's own actions
is not an acceptable remedial justification for racial preferences.29
Justice O'Connor, who would eventually become the author of the
Grutter majority opinion, wrote separately in Wygant. She made three
important points on this subject. First, she clarified that a majority of the
Court accepts diversity as a compelling interest, at least in the context of
higher education.3 ° Second, she agreed that the government in Wygant was
not seeking to use race to achieve diversity. 3' Finally, she wrote that
nothing "forecloses the possibility that the Court will find other
governmental interests which have been relied upon in the lower courts but
which have not been passed on here to be sufficiently 'important'
or
'compelling' to sustain the use of affirmative action policies." 32
Other opinions, prior to Grutter,contain hints that some, but certainly
not all, Justices were prepared to entertain non-remedial interests as
compelling. In Croson, the Court struck down the city of Richmond's
program of racial preferences in contracting because Richmond had not
substantiated the remedial need for the preferences. Richmond had not
advanced any non-remedial justifications for the program. However,
Justice Stevens wrote separately in Croson to emphasize that such
justifications should not be categorically foreclosed as a matter of
constitutional law. 33 Three years after Croson, now-Justice Ginsburg
agreed in a concurrence in O'Donnell Construction Company v. District of
Columbia with Justice Stevens' position "that remedy for past wrong is not

28.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
29.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-77 (plurality opinion).
30.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Supreme Court
accepted broadcast diversity as a non-remedial justification for the use of race and gender
preferences in another context-the distribution of broadcast licenses. However, the
preferences in that case were not subject to strict scrutiny, only intermediate scrutiny. It was
not until the Court's ruling in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), that the
Court subjected federal race and gender measures to strict scrutiny. Therefore, it is
uncertain whether diversity in this broader context is a compelling interest.
31.
Id. at 288 n.*.
32.
Id. at 286.
33.
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 & n.l (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with the
Court's apparent remedial-only premise). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 257-58 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the recognition of diversity as
a compelling state interest would not be inconsistent with the Court's precedent).

2004]

THE PERMISSIBILITY OF NoN-REMEDIAL JUSTIFICATIONS

the exclusive basis upon which racial classification may be justified. 3 4 Of
course, several Justices in Croson (including, surprisingly, Justice
O'Connor herself) appeared to reject the constitutional possibility of nonremedial goals. 35 As a result, after Croson, some lower courts had begun to
reject diversity itself as an acceptable non-remedial goal.36
Emerging from this uncertain history is Grutter. With an opinion that
now commands a majority of Justices, Grutter has conclusively established
the possibility of non-remedial objectives for race-based programs. In
particular, it has validated student body diversity in higher education as a
compelling enough interest to justify racial preferences. The time is now
ripe for judicial scrutiny of other potential non-remedial justifications for
race-based programs.
2.

OperationalNeeds as a Compelling Interest

Besides diversity, a frequent candidate for consideration as a nonremedial justification for racial preferences is an agency's "operational
needs." The argument is that for certain government agencies, such as
local police departments, to be effective and have the cooperation and
confidence of the communities they serve, the agencies must demonstrably
represent all racial segments of the local community.
In the law
enforcement context, the operational needs justification for race
consciousness has been recognized by members of the Supreme Court,37
and by lower courts.3 8

34.
O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
35.
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, &
Kennedy, JJ.) ("Unless [racial classifications] are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.").
36.
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting "the diversity
rationale" in the context of education); Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d
344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that "diversity" cannot constitute a compelling
government interest in employment); Johnson v. Bd. Of Regents, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1373 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (reaching the same conclusion because of insufficient evidence to
support the claim that racial diversity enhances education; without evidentiary backing, the
claim is too "amorphous, unquantifiable, and temporally unlimited ...").
37.
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]n law enforcement..
in a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might
reasonably conclude that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with
the community and thereby do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a
force composed only of white officers."); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 n.18
(1987) (plurality opinion) (noting, but not deciding, the contention that race-conscious
hiring can "restore[ ] community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and facilitate[ J
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However, courts will not entertain operational needs as a justification
without evidentiary substantiation. To avoid rendering "blind deference"
to the executive branch of government, of which the majority in Korematsu
has been accused, operational needs must be demonstrated with a "factual
predicate. 39 Conjecture alone is not sufficient. 4° Furthermore, because
many of the early cases accepting the operational needs rationale occurred
before the strict scrutiny regime was established in the 1989 Croson
decision, those decisions did not need to evaluate whether operational
needs rose to the level of a "compelling" interest. 41 Recent cases have been
more skeptical of the operational needs rationale and demonstrate that
government must demonstrate that the need is indeed compelling.4 2
The Seventh Circuit's 1996 decision of Wittmer v. Peters43 strictly
scrutinized and upheld as compelling the operational need to use race in an

effective police service by encouraging citizen cooperation.").
38.
See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996); Wessman v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790, 795 (1st Cir. 1998); Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1988); Talbert v.
City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981) (racial diversity found to enhance the
effectiveness of the police department); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d
671, 696 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that the argument "is not simply that blacks communicate
better with blacks or that a police department should cater to the public's desires. Rather, it
is that effective crime prevention and solution depend heavily on the public support and
cooperation which result only from public respect and confidence in the police.");
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. N.Y. 1999)
("[P]olice department's 'operational needs' can be a compelling state interest which might
justify race-based decision-making."); Minnick v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 157 Cal. Rptr. 260
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
39.
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 278-79 n.5 (1986); Hayes v.
N. State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding opinion of
police chief that effective law enforcement required racial diversity insufficient alone to
create a compelling state interest; city was required to support its contention with objective
evidence as well).
40.
McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998).
41.
E.g., Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981); Detroit Police
Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (4th Cir. 1979).
42.
Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir.
1993), for example, examined whether an operational needs rationale could support a
municipality's effort to ensure police department diversity. Although the Fourth Circuit did
not decide whether the operational need for a racially diverse police force could be a valid
compelling interest, it held that the city failed to present sufficient evidence regarding the
benefits of diversity on police operations. See also Cotter v. City of Boston, 193 F. Supp.
2d 323, 340, 342-43 (D. Mass. 2002). Although the City argued for "meaningful minority
representation" to foster community cooperation and effectively serve these communities,
the court found "cynical" the assumption "that members of a particular race will only
cooperate with members of their own race" and there is "no logical stopping point" to such
reasoning. Id.
43.
87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
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employment program. In Wittmer, the government openly took race into
account in preferring to promote a black correctional worker to lieutenant
at a prison boot camp. The boot camp facility required prison guards to
assume a military-style authority and drill sergeant-like control over the
inmates. The government did not attempt to justify its racial preference on
the basis of a need to correct past discrimination in promotions. Rather, it
argued it could not accomplish its "mission of pacification and
reformation" of the prison's predominantly black inmates with a
correctional staff that was almost entirely white and had no black
supervisors. 44 Based on this non-remedial rationale for promoting one
black to lieutenant, the Court reversed the lower court's judgment against
the government and held that the non-remedial benefit of successful prison
administration justified the racial preference.45
Wittmer's discussion of the permissibility of non-remedial
justifications for the use of race foreshadowed that of the Supreme Court in
Grutter. Wittmer expressly rejected as not authoritative any "dicta" in
Croson, possibly suggesting that "the only form of racial discrimination
that can survive strict scrutiny is discrimination designed to cure the ill
effects of past discrimination .. .. "46 Wittmer then required that any
proffered non-remedial justification for a racial preference be motivated by
a "powerful and worthy concern" for which the preference is an "apt
response, ''47 obvious synonyms for compelling interests and narrow
tailoring. The correctional objective of inmate reform at the prison boot
camp was sufficiently compelling
to support the use of race in promoting a
48
black officer to lieutenant.
Wittmer recognized that the government must substantiate its asserted
benefit from the conscious use of race, rather than rely on speculation.4 9
The government provided unrebutted expert evidence from recognized
experts in prison administration. These experts established the need to
appoint one black to a position of supervisory authority figure in a prison
with a predominantly black population. Wittmer emphasized that the
demonstrated need was not a generalized goal of racial balance or even
diversity. Rather, it was specifically the achievement of inmate reform.5 °

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

87 F.3d at 920.
Id. at 920-21.
id.at 919.
Id.at 918.
Id. at 920.
Id.
87 F.3d at 920.
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Finally, Wittmer did not require that the evidence supporting the nonremedial benefit of blacks in authority precede the use of the racial
preference. "If academic research is required to validate any departure
from strict racial neutrality, social experimentation in the area of race will
be impossible despite its urgency.'
Under those circumstances, "[i]t
would be impossible to accrue experience on the issue .... ,52 Therefore,
the court allowed the government first to adopt the racial preference and
study the non-remedial benefit to the prison operations after.
The significance of Wittmer is that it is a post-Croson appellate
decision applying strict scrutiny to a non-remedial interest and upholding it
as compelling. Although the operational need specifically approved in
Wittmer may be limited to law enforcement, the case confirms the
possibility of other non-remedial justifications for race-consciousness,
besides student body diversity, in government programs.
The Seventh Circuit confirmed that possibility last year in Petit v.
City of Chicago.5 3 In Petit, the City of Chicago defended its policy of
race-consciously increasing the scores slightly of African-American and
Hispanic police officers who took a promotional examination.54 The City
explained that it marginally raised minority scores to increase the number
of minorities promoted to sergeant and thereby achieve diversity in the
supervisory ranks of the law enforcement workforce.5 5 The City claimed
that it had an operational need to employ racially diverse supervisory
personnel to establish trust and cooperation in the racially
diverse communities in which they served.56
The Seventh Circuit approved as compelling the City's operational
need for workforce diversity. 57 Relying heavily on Grutter'sanalysis that
diversity is a compelling interest, the Court held that "there is an even more
compelling need for diversity in a large metropolitan police force charged
with protecting a racially and ethnically divided major American city like
Chicago. 58 Like the Supreme Court's "deference to a university's
academic decisions" in Grutter,59 "it is proper in this case to rely on the
views of experts and Chicago police executives that affirmative action was

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.

Id.
Id.
352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1114-15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114-15.

539 U.S. at 328.
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warranted to enhance the operations of the [police force]. ' 6° The evidence
supported that minorities are "frequently distrustful of' and express a "lack
of confidence in" the police, "reduce[ing] the willingness of some
community members to cooperate with the police.",6' This hostility "will
naturally abate" when "police officers are routinely supervised by
minorities," enhancing "the department's ability to prevent and solve
crime. ,,62
B.

THE NARROWLY TAILORED USE OF RACE FOR NON-REMEDIAL ENDS

Once the government has identified a compelling, non-remedial basis
for using race in its decision making, the inquiry shifts to whether the
manner in which it uses race is narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling
interest. In determining whether race-based measures are narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling interest, the Supreme Court has usually considered
some or all of the following factors: (1) whether the government considered
race-neutral alternatives before applying the racial criteria, (2) the manner
in which race is used in making a decision--e.g., is it one of many factors
to be considered, or is it the sole or dominant factor, (3) the relationship of
any numerical racial goal to the composition of the relevant candidate pool,
(4) the scope of the program, (5) the duration of the program, and (6) the
impact of the program on nonminorities.6 3
The first factor requires a "serious, good faith consideration" of race
neutral alternatives. 64 It does not, however, require that the government
exhaust every conceivable race neutral option, or that those options force
the government to forfeit other legitimate goals.65 Thus, in Grutter, the
Court said Michigan was not required to resort to a randomized lottery or
drastically reduce its reliance on grade point average or test scores to obtain
diversity, because those alternatives would force Michigan to sacrifice its
goal of educational excellence. 66
The second factor concerns quotas. In Grutter, the Court examined
whether Michigan's system established quotas under which Michigan
reserved certain seats exclusively for the favored races. It held that the

60.
Petit,352 F.3d at 1114.
61.
Id. at 1115.
62. Id.
63.
See generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987); Hayes v. N.
State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir. 1993).
64.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 339.
65. Id.

66.

Id.
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program did not.67 Rather, race is just one of many factors evaluated in an
individualized inquiry to determine a person's potential contribution to the
educational experience of the student body, thereby enabling persons of
any race to compete for any spot. Therefore, in the Court's view, the
Michigan program was not a quota.6 8
A limited quota, however, is not necessarily fatal to a non-remedial
use of race. In Wittmer, the lieutenant spot was exclusively reserved for a
black officer. 69
No white officer could possibly have attained it.
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit approved this limited quota. It did so in
part because the government was not generally seeking to use race in all
promotions to achieve complete racial balance with the prison population.
That would have been an unacceptably broad quota out of step with the
demonstrated need for the use of race.7 °
The third narrow tailoring factor-comparing a numerical selection
goal to the applicant pool-is best exemplified in the remedial setting. If a
government agency intends to preferentially hire minorities, narrow
tailoring requires that it hire them in numbers no greater than needed to
correct their under-representation in the agency (due to discrimination) as
compared to the applicant population. 71 By analogy, in the non-remedial
context, the government might satisfy this factor by limiting its recruitment
of minority candidates to the minimum number needed to achieve its nonremedial objective. Thus, in Grutter, the Court held that Michigan tailored
its program appropriately by limiting its use of race only to the extent
necessary to achieve the "critical mass" of minorities that would improve
the educational experience of the student body.72
The fourth factor-scope--demands that a government agency limit
the use of race to only those groups whose inclusion will foster the
government's interest. In Croson, the Court invalidated Richmond's
remedial racial preferences in public contracting in part because the

67.
Id. at 2342.
68.
Id. at 2342-44.
69.
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996).
70.
Id. at 920. However, in Petit v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit expressly
permitted racial diversity to justify race conscious promotions in the workforce. There, the
Chicago Police Department explicitly used race in making promotions to sergeant so as to
achieve a supervisory workforce that better reflected the demographics of the population
being policed. The Court allowed this practice because of the strong evidence of the
operational need for diversity to achieve effective policing. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
71.
The racial preferences in hiring should be "a plausible lower-bound estimate of
a shortfall in minority representation among [selected candidates] that is due to the
[agency's] discrimination." McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1224 (7th Cir.
1998). Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2000).
72.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 329, 333, 335-36.
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program included minority groups, such as Aleuts, as to whom there was
no demonstrated need for a remedy.7 3 By contrast, in Grutter, the
University of Michigan's preferences were limited to enhancing the
population of only those underrepresented minorities whose meaningful
presence was needed to obtain the desired educational benefits.74
The fifth factor is duration. A race-based measure is constitutionally
permissible only as long as it is needed to obtain its intended benefit.75
Such measures should be subject to periodic review to ensure they do not
outlast their avowed purpose.76 In Grutter, the Court explained that the
government should not have to resort indefinitely to race-based programs
to fulfill even compelling interests. 77 Rather, the Court believed, over time
it ought to be possible for public bodies to identify race-neutral techniques
for achieving the benefits that flow from student diversity. 78 In the specific
context of higher education, the Court admonished as follows: "We expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today. 79
Finally, the Court requires that the preferences not impose an undue
burden on nonminorities. Here, as with the factor concerning quotas, the
Court examines the degree to which persons outside of the favored
categories are excluded from the benefit in question. In Grutter, the Court
found there was no undue burden on nonminorities seeking admission
because the University of Michigan made an individualized inquiry of each
candidate. Under this holistic approach, Michigan will select "nonminority
applicants who have greater potential to enhance student body diversity
over underrepresented minority applicants." 80 In Wittner, there was no
undue burden because the exclusion of nonblack candidates for promotion
was apparently limited to just one position. 8'

73.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
74.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329, 333, 335-36.
75.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
76.
Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir.
1993).
77.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 343. In Petit v. City of Chicago, the Court emphasized that the race
conscious promotions of minority police officers to supervisors was limited to an
approximately five-year period. 352 F.3d at 1118.
80.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 341.
81.
Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920.
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NON-REMEDIAL GOALS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTING

With the Supreme Court authorizing lower courts to consider
compelling, non-remedial justifications for the use of race in public
programs, it is natural to inquire whether such justifications for racial
preferences exist in public contracting. The Seventh Circuit itself has
asked, but not yet answered, that precise question. In the case of Builders
Association of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 82 the Seventh Circuit
reviewed whether Cook County had put forth an adequate remedial
justification for racial preferences in its public contracting program.
Although the court ultimately determined that there was an insufficient
record of a remedial need for the set-asides, it discussed the concept of
non-remedial goals.
First, the court characterized as "unsettled" the question of whether a
public body may ever advance non-remedial justifications.83 The court
recognized that the Seventh Circuit itself had said yes in Wittmer, and that
the Supreme Court may eventually address the question (as it did in
Grutter). However, because Cook County "ha[d] not advanced any nonremedial justification for the minority set-aside program," the court did not
have an opportunity to evaluate the nature of a justification
that might be
84
considered compelling in the public contracting arena.
The separate case of Builders Association of Greater Chicago v. City
of Chicago8 appears to be the first public contracting case in which a
municipality has advanced a non-remedial justification (in addition to a
remedial one) for racial preferences. In that case, the City of Chicago
presented economic expert testimony establishing that the City's set-aside
program fulfilled the City's compelling interest in stimulating its own vital
economic development. 86 Minority-owned firms locate themselves within
the City's disadvantaged areas, and hire workers residing within those
areas, at rates much greater than the nonminority firms. Therefore, racial
contracting preferences result in the City retaining within its economic
boundaries in general, and its disadvantaged areas in particular, tens of
millions of its own public tax dollars.87 This retention has helped the City
achieve vital economic stimulation: a rehabilitated property tax base,

82.
256 F.3d at 642 (7th Cir. 2001).
83.
Id. at 644.
84.
Id.
85.
96 C 1122, 2003 WL 1786489 (N.D. Il.) (pending before Moran, J.).
86.
See the trial transcript of Builders Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 96 C 1122 (N.D.
Ill.) (pending before Moran, J.) at pages 1697-1739 and Def.'s Exhs. 399A-D.
87.
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increased employment, raised wages and ignited business activity in
disadvantaged areas and throughout the City. 88 Thus, the justification of
vital economic development resembles, on a city-wide level, an operational
needs rationale that has been approved in other, more limited contexts.
When the City first presented this defense to the district court before
trial, the Supreme Court had not yet decided Grutter. The district judge
refused to allow the City to invoke a non-remedial justification for its
contracting preferences, in part because it believed that non-remedial
considerations may never justify race-conscious action. 89 In light of
Grutter's explicit willingness to allow non-remedial defenses to race-based
measures, this aspect of the court's decision may be invalid.
The district court raised two other concerns regarding the
permissibility of the specific non-remedial goal of vital economic
development. A government agency would have to develop adequate
responses to these concerns before it could expect judicial acceptance of a
non-remedial goal of vital economic development. First, the court feared
that the economic development objective was too "broad and limitless" to
serve as a valid justification. 90 However, the Supreme Court faced a
similar criticism of the diversity rationale in the Michigan cases. The
opponents of racial preferences claimed that "diversity as a basis for
employing racial preferences is simply too open-ended, ill-defined, and
indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting
narrowly-tailored means.'
Because of Michigan's limited and
presumptively temporary use of race, the Court rejected the claim that
diversity was intrinsically indefinite. 92
Likewise, vital economic
development can be a time-limited goal if the nature and quantity of the
needed development are defined with adequate precision. In particular, a
goal of vital economic development could be restricted to fulfilling a city's
mandatory economic needs, such as reviving distressed regions

88.
Id.
89.
Builders Ass'n v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 1122, 2003 WL 1786489 at * 7
(N.D. 11. April 1, 2003) (deciding motion in limine to bar testimony in support of nonremedial defense).
Id. at * 8. This fear may be based on language from Wygant, where a plurality
90.
of the Court found that "societal discrimination" could not be a compelling remedial interest
because, "without more, [it] is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. Otherwise, a "court could uphold remedies that are
ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future." Id.
91.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at
17-18, 40-41).
92.
Id.
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experiencing specified hardships of severe unemployment and economic
inactivity.
The second concern the district court raised was that a vital economic
development rationale could theoretically justify public contracting
preferences for whites. The court believed that if there were cities in which
favoring whites might foster vital economic growth, such cities could
justify a preference for white contractors.9 3 Based on the expert testimony
in the Builders Association of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago case,
that scenario is unlikely. It would apply only where whites concentrated
their firms in, and hired white employees from, depressed cities in need of
vital development, while their minority counterparts resided and worked in
the surrounding, more affluent
suburbs.94 That, however, is not the
95
experience in this country.
To further enhance its justification for racial preferences in public
contracting, a government might also consider supplementing an economic
development rationale with the need for racial diversity in the ownership of
public contractors. The Court in Grutterfound there was a need for racial
diversity in higher education, in part, because our nation's future leaders
might lack "legitimacy" if they come from institutions that are not "visibly"
open to all races.96 If the firms engaged in urban construction projects are
principally white-owned, there may be similar risks to the perceived
legitimacy of the public leaders selecting these firms if the firms are
performing work in, and receiving taxpayer dollars from, communities of
color. To respond to that risk, the government may examine the need for
some limited "critical mass" of visible diversity among qualified
contractors. In this way, a non-remedial, diversity rationale might play a
role in justifying public contracting preferences.97
Of course, any non-remedial justification for racial preferences in
public contracting would be subject to the constraints of narrow tailoring.
93.
Builders Ass'n v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 1122, 2003 WL 1786489 at * 8
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2003).
94.
Trial transcript of Builders Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 96 C 1122 (N.D. Ill.,
pending before Moran, J.) at pages 1697-1739 and Defs Exhs. 399A-D.
95.
Id.
96.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
97.
Such an argument, however, could create tension with the plurality opinion in
Croson. There, the Court dismissed as illegitimate a system of racial preferences that
amounted to nothing more than "outright racial balancing." City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989) (plurality opinion). See also Wittmer v. Peters, 87
F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996) (clarifying that the government may not create racial
preferences that merely reflect the "extortionate demands" of. constituents). Grutter's
limitation of the diversity rationale to the "critical mass" required to bring about the desired
benefits may reconcile these conflicting views.
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For example, opponents might argue that a race-neutral city residency
requirement could achieve the same kind of economic development as a
contracting preference for minority firms. However, even if true, this
objection might be obviated if the government combined its non-remedial
development goal with a non-remedial diversity goal or remedial goal of
rectifying discrimination. A residency requirement alone could not satisfy
the remedial goal of rectifying discrimination against minority-owned firms
or create the visible racial openness necessitated by a diversity rationale.
The other narrow tailoring requirements discussed above in Part I.B.
would also apply to these non-remedial goals. These requirements
essentially demand that the program achieve its goals, and do so without
outlasting its purpose or unduly restricting the opportunities of
nonminorities. In the context of the non-remedial goals of vital economic
development and diversity, the government would have to show that its
racial contracting preferences actually achieved the desired results. The
preferences would have to be limited to those classes of firms that can
produce the needed economic development and governmental legitimacy.
Also, the minority contractors hired would have to be qualified, because
without quality contractors the goal of legitimacy would not be enhanced.
Furthermore, to avoid the objection that the preferences were rigid quotas,
they would have to be flexible enough to allow nonminorities to compete
when qualified minority firms are not available. Finally, the program
would have to be subject to periodic review and not be designed for
perpetuity. These narrow tailoring requirements are stringent but not
necessarily insurmountable. Municipalities interested in reigniting their
own economies and visibly demonstrating their openness to all races would
do well to consider using narrowly tailored racial preferences in public
contracting to achieve these arguably compelling, non-remedial ends.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has opened the door for public bodies and courts
to consider non-remedial justifications for the use of racial preferences in
allocating public benefits. Any such justifications must be compelling. In
limited contexts, courts have held that the non-remedial goals of racial
diversity and fulfilling the operational needs of government can be
compelling reasons to depart from racial neutrality. Municipalities may
now consider arguing that such compelling goals can justify racial
preferences in public contracting. However, such racial preferences must
also be narrowly tailored. The non-remedial goals of creating vital
economic development and enhancing public legitimacy may justify the
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limited and flexible use of racial preferences in carefully defined
circumstances.

